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Summary Abstract 
We discuss a multi-trophic model of socio-ecological systems to investigate how early trade 
with non-Inuit communities affected long run opportunities for Inuit. The model helps identify 
historical governance gaps that have created lingering legacies today. At the base are living natural 
resources, in the middle are their human harvesters, and at the top are any managers of communities 
who may not directly harvest resources but can organize activities that increase the resource base 
and/or its harvestability. These increases create returns from physical and human capital. The level 
of returns depends upon governance of the resource use. The effects of trade include both direct 
changes, e.g. in the population and in the resource base, and indirect changes through institutional 
gaps.  
 A change in the terms of trade within the existing socio-ecological systems accompanied new, 
desirable goods like tea and tobacco, first with contact to Russian fur traders and then with the 
American whaling fleet. What held value came to change over time with its ability to be monetized 
or traded for non-Inuit goods. Examples include Arctic fox and Bowhead whales. Early trading and 
harvesting seemed relatively innocuous -- unlikely to affect Inuit communities’ ability to thrive 
within limited but balanced socio-ecological system exchanges. Both Inuit and outside traders saw 
trades as mutually beneficial. Further, trade introduced new technologies (e.g. guns, traps) that 
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lowered harvest costs. These introductions also, however, increased resource pressures and diseases 
that reduced human populations, sometimes rapidly. These introduced technologies and diseases 
and the changes in the relative value of marketable goods shifted communities away from a set of 
equilibrium conditions under which Inuit communities had been generally capable of sustained 
operations at or near carrying capacity for the environment and technology available.   
These transformations changed the potential role of the top layer of the socio-ecological system. 
The increased availability of physical capital and the increased pressure on the resource base and 
population led quickly to new economic challenges that needed changes in stewardship and 
institutions. In particular, institutional solutions needed to address dynamic impacts from 
overharvesting of common resources and to assure that trade not only increased present day well-
being but also increased intertemporal well-being in order to restore equilibrium to the dynamics of 
the communities. Where ecological knowledge previously had generated most Inuit technology, the 
transformation in capital, technology and values required stewardship more than ecological 
knowledge. Such stewardship evolved too slowly, while technical ecological knowledge 
simultaneously eroded. Better understanding of the underpinnings of these failures should improve 
understanding future economic development’s opportunities without losing the benefits derived 
from the long-successful Inuit socio-ecological systems, which include, inter alia, superb 
technologies derived from full integration in the socio-ecological system. 
 
Keywords: natural resource dynamics, institutional change, socio-ecological governance, Arctic 
Inuit economic development, Traditional Ecological Knowledge. 
1.  Introduction 
Using both archeological and historical evidence from natural resource use by Arctic Inuit 
communities, we discuss the role resource pressure, and lack thereof, has played in the historic 
development of current Inuit communities’ resource governance. In particular, we focus on the roles 
of trade and technology in transforming well-functioning, holistic, socio-ecological systems into 
hybrid market and non-market economies. Understanding the economics of this transition allows 
one to highlight potential long run institutional gaps in governance of ecosystem services that may 
assist in generating unwelcome development paths. Through the combined lens of resource 
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economics and new institutional economics, we discuss an analytical framework that illuminates 
several important aspects of broadly applicable principles affecting the nature and causes of growth 
and institutional change.  
Simple historical economies3 provide opportunities for insights into economic theory that are 
more difficult to disentangle in more complex globally integrated economies (e.g. (Brander & 
Taylor, 1998; Fisk & Shand, 1970; Kaiser & Roumasset, 2014; Taylor, 2011)). Such simple 
historical cases, however, often lack sufficiently delineable evidence covering the range of 
evolutionary pressures needed to inform broadly across a developmental spectrum due to the lack of 
written historical records. For example, in many models of simple economies, resource 
development is inextricably and monotonically linked to population dynamics (e.g. Brander and 
Taylor, 1998). This is potentially misleading in that these models do not allow much scope for 
shifts in such important dynamic factors in resource use as trade opportunities, technological 
progress, or development of a capital-intensive class. The relatively well-documented and dramatic 
transition from resource-based, closed, Inuit economies and societies through their economic and 
institutional integration into the high-GDP economies of the US, Canada and Denmark (Greenland) 
provides opportunity to investigate the dynamic relationships between a resource base and the 
population generating total economic value 4  from it, including governance and institutional 
structures.  
We take Kaiser and Roumasset’s (2014) model as our starting point, combining theories of costs 
and benefits of governance and institutional change (New Institutional Economics, see e.g. (Ménard 
& Shirley, 2005)) and ecological models of resource dependency (Resource Economics, see e.g. 
(Costanza et al., 2014; Costanza, Wainger, Folke, & Mäler, 1993; Van den Bergh, 2002)). In this 
dynamic model of a resource-based economy, governance co-evolves with production, 
specialization, and population. They apply the model to the case of Hawaiian economic 
development, with a focus on the gains from specialization and the development of a productive 
managerial elite. The introduction of trade at the end of the 18th Century shifts returns to capital and 
                                                          
3 By simple economies, we refer to economic conditions where the number of goods and services produced and/or 
traded are significantly limited by opportunity and availability of resources and technology.  
4 Total economic value is defined as the value of the net benefits to society, fully measured. This includes direct 
and indirect use values as well as non-use values. It is particularly appropriate for use in cases such as this Inuit 
economic analysis where market activities are highly incomplete measures of value. See Emerton, 2016 for a more 
detailed overview.  
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trade, so that the institutional evolution transforms from increasing efforts to capture hierarchical 
benefits of control to efforts to increase decentralized benefits from information. The Inuit and 
Hawaiian cases have many similarities – they are both historically isolated communities dependent 
on a limited supply of natural resources. Distinctions between the two communities, however, 
especially with respect to the building, use and management of capital, enable comparative analysis 
of the roles of trade and technology in socio-ecological systems under stress from dramatic shifts in 
values and/or productivity. By bringing anthropological and scientific research to bear in our 
economic model (e.g. (McGhee, 2007; Raghavan et al., 2014), we separate and examine extensive 
growth, intensive growth, and trade and technological evolution as it depends on an initial resource 
base.  
We model an economic system in which a composite resource stock, or ecosystem, is harvested 
for use by a human population, where the resource stock is subject to natural biophysical limits. 
These biophysical constraints have dynamic feedback effects on the stock. These constraints are 
affected by the (transactions) costs of managing and governing harvest from a composite 
ecosystem. The ecosystem stock is harvested for three purposes: consumption by the (endogenous) 
laborer (subsistence-motivated) portion of the population, export in exchange for goods external to 
the resource base, and/or capital (wealth) accumulation that sustains a capital-endowed, governing 
class whose contribution to growth stems primarily from increased returns to capital. The governing 
class is considered, in the language of ecology, a ‘top predator.’ They are the source of capital 
accumulation and technological change. These multi-trophic interconnections differentiate and 
broaden the story from primarily open-economy discussions where resources are providing different 
returns from physical and/or human capital (Carboni & Russu, 2013; Eliasson & Turnovsky, 2004; 
Lopez, Anriquez, & Gulati, 2007).  
In Inuit Arctic communities, this top trophic level takes the form of Human Capital. This human 
capital manifests itself as Traditional Ecological Knowledge or TEK. TEK can play two important 
roles. It can directly increase the efficacy of resource harvesting (e.g. improved harpooning), thus 
increasing labor productivity (catchability), increasing pressure on the resource. It can otherwise 
increase the base resource’s productivity (e.g. improving use of marine mammal parts for 
sustenance and survival -- capital deepening), potentially increasing or decreasing resource 
pressures, depending on how this shifts relative growth rates of the resource and the population – 
that is, whether life (wealth) is improving in such a way that population expansion or contraction 
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follows5. This latter use of capital may allow for reduction in intraspecific competition of the 
human population (e.g. through territorial expansion into unused resources). Changes in 
(exogenous) resource values, harvesting and governance costs for common property resources, and 
costs of enforcing resource use for wealth accumulation (e.g. protecting an elite or governing class) 
and/or trade (e.g. regulation of markets or other governance of exchange) are investigated in order 
to explore the co-evolution of governance structures and resource pressures. In our exploration, we 
present sparse evidence substantiating stylized facts about past and recent historical Inuit economic 
development. 
2. Dynamic Theory of Resource Use and Institutional Change  
We begin with a simplified exposition of the Inuit case in the context of extensive growth, 
intensive growth, technology and trade in resource use for a resource-based economy. To focus on 
the most resource-constrained communities, we limit our analysis to those communities existing 
above the tree line. The isolation of Arctic Inuit communities to groups facing similar resource 
limitations and technological challenges and the severity and seasonal extremes of the climate 
meant that there were severe limitations in providing new technologies or trade opportunities for 
much of the communities’ development. The substantial levels of internal trade and connectivity 
amongst historical Inuit communities (Aporta, 2009; M. W. Betts, 2007) allow us to simplify the 
modeling to that of a pan-Arctic Inuit community, where the variations in communities are explored 
within the model framework to support the model findings. This allows for clearer insights into the 
intertwined relationship between institutional change and stages of growth. 
2.1 Archaeological and Historical Record in the Context of Development 
The Thule, unlike their predecessors, appear to have successfully harnessed dogs for 
transportation, creating Pan-Arctic capabilities for (seasonal) communication, trade and exchange 
throughout the Inuit Arctic (Cooper, Mason, Mair, Hoffecker, & Speakman, 2016; Morey & Aaris-
Sørensen, 2002) beginning around the 13th Century AD6. As this trade required highly stable ice 
                                                          
5 Important exogenous population shifts from contact with new diseases can also be considered in this framework. 
6 In the Inuit Arctic as a whole, there have been two main population waves, with the second, Thule Inuit 
population replacing an original Arctic culture in about the 13th Century CE (Raghavan et al., 2014). As there is 
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coverage of the land and seascapes, it remained limited to populations with similar resource 
endowments and did not greatly expand the diversity of ecosystem services available for use. The 
descendant Inuit populations include several small communities from Eastern Siberia through 
Greenland, with some distinctions in resource abundancies and accompanying technologies. We 
focus here on the Inuit population living above the tree line and on the earth covered in tundra (and 
sea covered at least seasonally in ice). For these individuals, most of their combined sustenance 
(food, clothing, shelter) came from the sea (marine or aerial).7 Coltrain (2009) calculates possible 
diet compositions from a number of Thule Inuit remains that suggest their ancient diets consisted of 
81-84% marine foods.  
While some food and resource material could be harvested individually, the lack of natural 
capital suitable for generating clothing, shelter, and heat/light in forms that could be individually 
collected meant that coordinated activities to acquire, in particular, large marine mammals (whales 
and walrus specifically) would be greatly valuable from the onset of any community. Ryan (2011) 
highlights the support that Coltrain, Hayes, and O'Rourke (2004) and Coltrain (2009) give to other 
research through their bioarchaeological findings that link Inuit status differences to bowhead whale 
distributions. These bioarchaeological findings show variability of the distribution of bowhead 
whales in ancient Inuit diets (Coltrain, 2009; Coltrain et al., 2004). 
Similarly, we should consider that the broad biophysical carrying capacity of the environment, 
even when carefully used for sustained human population’s needs, was low overall, with seasonal 
and/or specific abundances. Before significant trade with non-Inuit communities, the general lack of 
such resources as forests, metals, energy sources, and beasts of burden necessarily limited the need 
and development of broad technological progress; the major and important technological 
innovations are considered the dogsled and whaling tools including the harpoon, kayak (individual 
skin boat), and Umiak (large skin boat) (J. Anderson, 2011).  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
archaeological evidence of temporal population overlap but no virtually no genetic mixing (e.g. Moltke et al. (2015)), it 
is understood that the transition from the early to the current cultures is a full displacement of one set of institutions and 
technologies by another. With archaeological efforts still rather preliminary regarding this dramatic transition, we 
concentrate here on the second, integrated population of Thule Inuit, hereafter referred to as Inuit.  
7 The cases of Arctic populations utilizing land based resources such as reindeer and caribou or forests are also 
interesting, particularly in that wealth storage “on the hoof” was feasible and thus wealth accumulation and social 
stratification were more prominent components of population growth and development. We save these cases for future 
research. 
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2.2. Thule Migration and Trade 
 The uniformity of the language of North American and Greenlandic Inuit indicates that 
eastward expansion is recent (in the past 1000 years) and that such high degree of language 
similarity is the result of dispersion from a single source (McGhee, 2007). Genetic analysis further 
supports this (Raghavan et al, 2014). Hypotheses for this dispersion can be categorized in two main 
camps encompassed in our model: population growth that required increased resources and perhaps 
followed marine mammal migrations (extensive resource-limited growth), or trade-driven 
enterprise, primarily in search of more metals, to increase harvestability of sufficiently abundant 
resources (and possibly result in population growth). We suggest the latter was important for Pan-
Arctic expansion, while the former may have prevented southern migration, but that TEK may have 
been equally important or even more so. 
 Push factors for Arctic migration include inter-community hostility8 towards the south (i.e. by 
the Dene Indians, who occupied the forested areas) that then favored eastward over southern 
migration (McGhee, 2007), as did the technology of dog-sled transport. We therefore expect that 
technological transferability channeled migration between today’s Alaska on to Hudson’s Bay and 
across the Davis Strait to Greenland, exploiting the relatively rich resource base of the Arctic 
marine waters with developed TEK skills, in spite of the lack of land-based resources9.  
 Migration also may have been tied more directly to the resource base. Whale migration is a 
natural cycle that extends the regional abundance of resources to areas such as western Canadian 
Arctic. Hunting just one whale can provide up to 50 tons of meat and blubber and explains the 
establishment of more densely populated areas and villages of up to 100 people at more northern 
coasts (McGhee, 2007). Thus, replication of existing communities (extensive growth) could develop 
along a long shoreline with access to migrating whales (Higdon, 2008).  
 Apart from seasonal oscillation of whale abundances, long-term shifts in abundance may be 
another reason for some migration.10 Environmental shifts, e.g. during the small ice age in the 17th 
and 18th centuries and before, could have caused earlier Inuit to migrate to follow the changing 
                                                          
8 Existence of such hostility is indicated by archaeological evidence of armor and bows (McGhee, 2007).  
9 This is supported as well by the discussion in  M. W.  Betts and Friesen (2004) of the Thule Inuit development in the Mackenzie Delta of the Canadian Arctic, whereby existing TEK was applied in ideal environmental conditions to enable an increase in prosperity. 
10 That whales migrate and adapt to changes is shown by a recent case in Greenland. In the 1930s the Beluga whales moved norward, due to the warming of the waters of West Greenland (Freeman et al., 1998).  
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patterns of whales (Wenzel, 2009). Limiting factors for expansion were overcome with regional  
trade (Rasic, 2016) and with innovations such as tailored skin, bow and arrow, etc.; this technology 
was crucial for survival in the harsh Arctic climate. This supported a hunting way of life for both 
the earlier people who came to North America from the east (McGhee, 2007) and the modern Inuit. 
 Not only do geography, currents and animal migration patterns generate different productivity 
levels across these similar environments, they also present different accessibilities for early trade. 
Trade advanced into the Inuit communities both from the east (Higdon, 2008) and west (Bockstoce, 
2009), so that the last arena for direct trade with more developed economies was in the central 
Canadian archipelago (McGhee, 2017). Today, this area remains the least integrated into global 
market activity and the most dependent on its resource base for subsistence. It has not yet been 
significantly infiltrated even by (extractive) commercial fishing. From Jan 1, 2012 through Mar 31, 
2017, only two fishing vessels over 15 m length are known to have operated in any part of the 
archipelago. 11  The vessels are the Kiviuq 1, belonging to Nunavut’s Arctic Fishery Alliance 
(http://www.arcticfisheryalliance.com/vessels.html), which has fished from the east as far to the 
northwest as Bathurst and Cornwallis Islands, and Frosti, a Vancouver-based trawler that has fished 
as far east as Ulukhaktok on Victoria Island. No commercial fishing has occurred since 2012 from 
the western side of Victoria Island to the eastern side of Bathurst Island and down the eastern side 
of Baffin Island. The area meanwhile is slowly becoming open to tourism aiming to benefit from its 
distinctions from market driven economic forces.12  
 On the other end of the trading spectrum is one of the globe’s most productive marine 
environments: the southern coast of Alaska (McGhee, 2007). Exploited for thousands of years 
(Finney, Gregory-Eaves, Douglas, & Smol, 2002), these fishing grounds were also connectable via 
currents and migration patterns to Asia. McGhee (2007) theorizes that around 2000 years ago, 
access to metal tools of Bering Sea Aborigines produced a shift induced by trade, probably 
motivated by demand for furs and other Arctic products by an elite class of Asian societies. Further, 
this allowed Inuit to form new tools by utilizing the iron blades, i.e. carving ivory (McGhee, 2007). 
This would mean that eastward expansion already occurred in part with the possession of metal 
                                                          
11 This can be seen directly via globalfishingwatch.com’s map of fishing activities tracked by Automatic 
Identification Systems. 
12 The question of whether tourism can grow while being any less disruptive than other trade introductions remains an open one, with a growing research agenda.(Zeppel, 2006). 
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tools and improved tools. Moreover, the prospects of access to iron in the Eastern Arctic via iron 
ore or traded iron further support the role of iron as pull-factors for the movement to the east 
(McGhee, 2007). Indeed, some early trade in the east is likely to have occurred, as supported by the 
less fanciful medieval accounts of Thule and treasures such as Greenland kayaks on display at the 
cathedral of Oslo in the 16th Century, possibly dating back to the 13th Century13 (Vaughn, 1994). 
Guns, however, were unknown before the early 19th Century (Bockstoce, 2009). 
2.3 Technology 
 The separation of gains from trade, technology, and the lack of significant physical 
capitalization is a large part of what makes the Inuit case so useful in elucidating our model. 
Significant gains from TEK came through production of goods that could not be individually 
produced: group-organized labor increased both quantity and quality of subsistence. In particular, 
TEK enabled the transformation of the frozen Arctic tundra into self-sufficient integrated resource 
use communities. Gains from specialization and intensification in this system could be achieved, 
but there was little scope for wealth storage outside of human capital. While all historical Inuit held 
TEK capital that allowed for individual (family unit) survival, stratification of TEK and related 
physical capital was known to exist (Ryan, 2011) and has been particularly related to whale 
harvesting capabilities (Ryan, 2011; Stern, 2013). We focus here on the group investment in 
individual TEK and related physical capital that fosters the ability to catch and use large marine 
mammals. While important, this is only one component of Inuit activities, and communities 
engaged in communal whaling to greater and lesser degrees. The limited need for collective action 
and limited presence of physical capital restricted the growth of any elite. Any elite would have 
lacked a base upon which to survive without contributing directly to productivity; the harvest levels 
depended directly on TEK capital as an active component of the harvest (and was increased through 
the practice and learning afforded by harvest activities) rather than a passive investment cost. Thus 
the productivity of the TEK and related capital is directly viewed as a productive part of the socio-
ecological system.  
                                                          
13 Olaus Magnus writes in 1515 that he saw two Greenland kayaks hanging in the cathedral at Oslo. He was told 
that they had been taken by King Hakon IV of Norway (1217-63). The same king apparently gifted Edward III of 
England a polar bear in 1252 that was kept at the Tower of London (Vaughn, 1994). 
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 Furthermore, the value of TEK was infinitely depreciable, requiring intergenerational transfer. 
The investment in ‘toys’ which mimicked harvest and survival needs illustrates this (Laugrand & 
Oosten, 2008). Continued TEK is highly dependent on continued use of the resource base, so that 
trade not only supplemented TEK with enhancing technologies (e.g. guns, traps), but also may have 
increased the rate of its deterioration as the cost of this intergenerational transfer increased in 
relative terms, and shifted to incorporate the new technologies. Depreciation of TEK and 
introduction of new hunting technologies is therefore likely to have happened in waves. For 
example, resolution of conflicting accounts from Alaska now indicates that the first firearms 
appeared in that region during the 1820s and most likely dissipated east through native trade, while 
a second wave came after 1848, when the British whaling and trading fleet arrived and economic 
activity became more regular (Bockstoce, 2009). 
As resource pressures increase, Kaiser and Roumasset (2014) argue that returns to 
specialization, intensification, capitalization, technology and governance require additional 
centralization of authority and decision-making, which, in small populations with limited 
opportunities for external economies of trade, can be developed through hierarchy, if capital 
(wealth) accumulation is possible. A lack of managerial gains from formation of a governing elite, 
however, can limit hierarchical and/or institutional development, because limiting today’s 
production in search of higher gains tomorrow is neither necessary nor possible.  
In the Inuit Arctic case, without much storage of wealth possible, governance gains to hierarchy 
were limited – overharvesting was not contemplated as a human-induced problem; the gods, if 
properly requested, provided.14 While religious rules governed the hunt15, these rules were not 
functional taboos or otherwise limiting in the economic sense of governing community property. 
They were and continue to be more clearly associated with coordinated risk-sharing and risk 
abatement (see e.g. Ford et al. (2008) and (Ford, Smit, Wandel, & MacDonald, 2006). Thus, we 
interpret managerial investment (TEK) and related governance in this case as referring to the 
                                                          
14 The early Norse colonies in Greenland provide a contrast regarding attempts to support hierarchy and generate 
surplus elite in Arctic conditions. The Norwegian church and state taxed the colonies heavily with little in return, 
undoubtedly a contributing factor in their mysterious demise in the 16th Century (Kintisch, 2016; Vaughn, 1994). 
15 Alaskan Inuit, e.g., would hunt a whale guided by a shaman, including a distinguished hunter and certain rules and rituals had to be followed before the hunt, so that the whale would willingly give himself to the hunters (Freeman et al., 1998).  
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intensity and extent of ecosystem extraction rather than the quantity of any one species harvested. In 
terms of governance needs, this approach is akin to providing insights into ecosystem management 
rather than single-species management in current context. That is, we consider the resource base a 
composite good (e.g. marine mammals, birds, fish, etc) that can, through increasing levels of (costly 
to acquire) ecological knowledge, be utilized at higher and higher levels. Over- or improper use of 
any one component of the composite may jeopardize production of the whole, but dispersion of use 
within the composite can reduce risks (through diversification) and waste within the system.16 TEK 
is a key component of successful dispersion of ecosystem use. Further, this approach is consistent 
with Inuit management interests that incorporate broader aspects of the resource than population 
counts (Tyrrell, 2007). 
2.4 Illustration of the dynamic forces of ecosystem interactions, trade and TEK 
 
Figure 1: Multi-trophic resource-based economy 
 
                                                          
16 This composite ecosystem might be further broken down into its hedonic components, which would facilitate 
discussion of the transformation of relative resource values within the system. We save this for separate research. 
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Figure 1 illustrates the intertemporal choices and outcome directions in a resource based 
economy. First, the (composite) resource base is either harvested or it is allowed to grow for 
tomorrow.  
If harvested, portions of it may be consumed (feeding a subsistence population), traded, or 
‘invested.’ Investment feeds knowledge; human capital transfer is enabled at the cost of current 
direct production. Knowledge can increase future harvestability (lower harvest costs or increase 
dispersion options) or increase the future resource base, with differing impacts on long run growth. 
Trade severs ecological constraints by introducing goods and services from outside the existing 
resource base. If portions of the resource base that are not currently in use by the society are traded, 
trade can be win-win, as long as dynamic ecosystem impacts do not deteriorate the productive 
capacity of the system. Otherwise, trade may increase or decrease overall well-being depending on 
the terms of trade. Exchange must cover the dynamic costs of replacing the resource in the socio-
ecological system to be mutually beneficial. Trade that introduces technology used to increase the 
harvest beyond sustainable levels in the socio-ecological system – e.g. commercial whaling in the 
Arctic – may not be welfare enhancing.  
3. Intertemporal considerations of the multi-trophic system 
3.1 Value of the resource over time 
The value of the resource to society depends upon its division. Immediate consumption 
generates the initial level of well-being today, and provides the base for human population growth 
for tomorrow. The share to trade is exported for current additional benefit. It can enhance or detract 
from future growth in capital or a subsistence population dependent on whether consumption or 
investment goods are purchased. The share of the resource base devoted to supporting TEK capital 
creates value through investment in the human capital (TEK) of the population. The sum total 
determines the remaining resource base available for growth (or replenishment) and future value. 
3.1.1 Value from subsistence consumption 
The marginal value of consumption of the resource for human subsistence by individual 
harvesters will exhibit the standard properties of demand, so that increased consumption is expected 
15 
 
to increase wellbeing at a decreasing rate and so that diversity of consumption is valuable. Thus 
trade is of current interest as it can increase well-being through diversity of consumption. 
In addition to the current benefits of consumption and trade, the current harvest affects the 
future resource base and human population. The resource base grows as a positive function of 
ecosystem capacity and negative function of human harvest. The human population tomorrow is 
determined by the ability to convert consumption to growth (via an intrinsic growth rate), the death 
rate of the population, and the intraspecific rate of competition, i.e. the rate at which members of the 
population compete for the same resources. When there are sufficient resources so that there is no 
deadly competition for the resource base, it must be that the population either can simply expand 
with extensive growth (e.g. into new resource-rich areas) or reproduces so slowly as a function of a 
low net fertility rate that competition does not evolve. Further, this is a function of investment 
decisions by the capital holders, where capital accumulation (through TEK) can counteract 
crowding by resource-increasing investment and an expanding production possibilities frontier.  
Figure 2 provides an illustrative overview of this mid-trophic layer of the socio-ecological 
system. In it, dynamic self-sufficiency, TEK and technology are on display. The reproducing family 
unit is shown with its dogs, hunting gear, and clothing from marine mammals. This self-sufficiency 
is reproducible but there is little scope for wealth accumulation.  
 
Figure 2: The mid-trophic layer of the socio-ecological system, illustrated. 
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Image credit: "Esquimaux Indians of the Coast of Labrador" communicated by a Moravian 
missionary, drawn by Garret, engraved by Chapman, published by C. Jones, October 17, 
1818.  From Charles de Volpi, Newfoundland: A Pictorial Record 15 (Sherbrooke, Quebec: 
Longman Canada Limited, ©1972)  
3.1.2 Value from Human Capital formation 
The marginal benefit (utility) of capital accumulation may be described generally as a 
decreasing benefit function where total benefit from TEK (capital) shifts via changes in the benefits 
of wealth (perhaps prestige, power, or access to luxury goods). The share of the resource base that 
goes to capital contributes to current well-being through a technical transformation from the 
resource into capital allowing for new capital (ecological knowledge) formation. The opportunity 
costs of TEK are the reduction in resource availability for trade or direct consumption (and direct 
population growth). Capital investment or exogenous shifts in technology change the rate of this 
transformation from resource to capital. We presume that investment and/or contact with others 
through trade could increase the ability to transform the resource into capital value and would thus 
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increase the amount of capital available to the system. Capital depreciates; one may consider this 
depreciation rate to be the mortality rate for the holders of TEK.  
3.1.3 Value from trade 
The marginal benefit (utility) of the resource as an export commodity should also exhibit 
decreasing marginal returns, which shift via changes in opportunities for trade. The current net 
benefits to trade must be balanced against the lack of availability of that resource for either 
consumption or capital purposes. The human subsistence population and capital growth will be 
lower with more trade, unless trade replaces the lost resource base with new opportunities or 
reduces the effort required for resource extraction (shifts technology). These may include direct 
food supplies or changes in technology that affect the catchability coefficient.  Control of the 
resource for trade and the distribution of returns from trade are then important factors in support for 
the institutional structure of the economy. 
 3.2. Costs 
 The benefits of the harvest are countered by the costs of the harvest and costs of harvest 
governance (here, TEK-influenced dispersion), which apply regardless of end use of the resource. 
Here we discuss the relationships between marginal costs and the working of the resource 
dependent system. Note that all of these costs may also change through exogenous shocks over 
time. 
3.2.1. Current Harvest Costs and Costs of dispersion 
 The per-unit cost of harvest may be a function of the resource population and/or capital 
stock, though for simplicity we consider it exogenous. The effects of changes in the per unit 
enforcement costs of the shares to capital accumulation and trade (described further below) are 
expected to behave very similarly. The sensitivity of the effectiveness of harvest technology 
(essentially a ‘catchability factor’) to capital stock can be expected to act in the same manner as 
decreasing costs from increases in the stock (and vice-versa). Furthermore, the dynamics of 
endogenous harvest costs are explored in the renewable resources literature, so our discussion draws 
on these findings (see e.g. (Brander & Taylor, 1998; Eliasson & Turnovsky, 2004; Lopez et al., 
2007; Squires & Vestergaard, 2013)).  
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In general, failure to limit the harvest today is expected to result in overharvesting and 
inefficient allocation of the resource base across time (Hardin, 1968). This will not be the case, 
however, if resource pressure is sufficiently low that open access does not jeopardize the future 
harvest (Kaiser & Roumasset, 2014). The possibility of illicit harvesting is also low in the case of 
large marine mammal harvests, as collective action and specialized human capital are necessary. 
We therefore interpret governance costs of the harvest as broader than direct limitation of harvest 
that is generally the focus (see e.g. (Clark, 2005)). As we consider the resource base a composite 
good, the application of TEK to harvesting greater amounts within the composite resource 
(increasing dispersion of ecosystem use) is increasingly costly.  
An example of this might be as follows. A community is harvesting seals with essentially 
constant returns to scale and no need for limits due to abundance of seals and low human 
population. Arctic fox are not harvested – dispersion in ecosystem use is relatively low. Trade 
arises; fox fur becomes valuable for trade. TEK may be developed to also trap fox (TEK increases 
through increasing the share of the resource to capital) – in turn the use of the ecosystem becomes 
more broadly dispersed, and costs of this ecosystem harvesting as a whole are now higher.  
3.2.2. Current Enforcement Costs of Non-consumption 
We must also consider the costs of enforcing decisions regarding the shares to consumption, 
capital and trade. We do so separately, to allow flexibility in considering how shifts in external 
prices for the resource base may create different pressures and costs on enforcement, and in order to 
better reflect on the role of management and human capital. We assume that costs of portioning off 
the share to TEK holders, or capital accumulation, are non-decreasing in the share. This is because 
the more of the resource that is taken from direct consumption, the greater the monitoring costs and 
related costs of ensuring that the capital is efficiently allocated. We also assume that the costs are 
non-decreasing in the number of people needing to cooperate, as one expects in commons problems 
(Field, 1989; Glaeser & Shleifer, 2003; Kaiser & Roumasset, 2014). Costs of enforcing a share to 
trade may be considered similarly non-decreasing in the share to trade, but also with respect to 
population levels. This is because the opportunity cost of trade over consumption will increase 
and/or more individuals involved in trade result in more parties to monitor who might rather 
consume the resource.  
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 3.3 Resource Harvest 
The resource is harvested by the population at a per capita rate that determines its continued 
growth through its ability to convert a unit of resource into sustenance (for example the hunting 
success rate of a whale population), with an additional consideration. That is, this ability is a 
function of TEK and related physical capital. With respect to the latter consideration, we in general 
expect increases in capital investment (and/or harvest technology) to increase catchability of the 
resource population. The more abundant the resource, the easier the harvest, ceteris paribus, as one 
would expect (Clark, 2005; Clark & Munro, 1975). The transfer of TEK to catchability is what we 
consider the dispersion of use of the ecosystem. This transfer is such that increasing TEK increases 
the usability of the composite resource – in other words, it reflects breadth of use, or how much of 
the composite ecosystem base can be harvested and used. If TEK fails in the extreme to enable any 
transformation of the ecosystem base into sustenance, for example if all hunting techniques become 
ineffective, then use of the ecosystem falls to nothing and there can be no harvest, as no component 
of the composite resource can be made valuable. If TEK is fully implementable for the 
environmental conditions, then the use of the ecosystem -- its catchability -- is at its maximum rate 
for the existing technology – which may or may not be sustainable. We assume that this dispersive 
use is increasing in TEK investment. Achieving higher levels of dispersive use is shown in the 
Arctic context to require coordination activities by the TEK holders, as with whaling operations.  
Figure 3 illustrates an Inuit whale hunt. The image reflects the need for a steady and skilled 
crew, and the collaborative advantages in acquiring not only the whale but also other marine 
mammals.  
Figure 3: The whale hunt. 
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Image credit: Frédéric Back, from Inuit: Glimpses of an Arctic Past, by David Morrison and Geroges-Hébert  
Germain, Canadian Museum of Civilization, S2002-4627 
 3.4 Discussion of the socio-ecological system overall 
In short, there is an underlying maximization problem of the present value of the ecosystem for 
subsistence, trade, and capital formation across an infinite time horizon. This maximization is 
subject to constraints on the biological reproduction of the composite ecosystem resource, the 
biological reproduction of the human population, who are dependent on that resource, and the 
human (TEK) capital formation, which is also dependent on the resource as well as the population 
to harvest it.  
 Trade removes subsistence resources from the population and may effectively lower the cost 
of ecosystem harvest through the introduction of new technologies. At the extreme, trade may 
provide a partial-equilibrium17 exit strategy from the subsistence life; if the value of the traded 
resources is sufficiently high that it entirely compensates for long run subsistence benefits, then a 
corner solution to the maximization problem is to sell off sufficient ecosystem resources to move to 
a market based existence outside the ecosystem. This describes the underlying fundamentals of 
what is happening when Inuit decide, individually or as a community, to enter fully into a market-
based economy and move away from direct dependence on the resource base.  
                                                          
17 This is a partial equilibrium outcome because the new (market based) ultimately must be supported by resources 
from some other ecosystem.  
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  Exit by TEK holders hastens the capital depreciation as well. Thus, by couching the returns to 
trade in terms of the present value of foregone well-being to the community, one can examine the 
tradeoffs involved in making this exit at the individual and/or community level. This allows one to 
begin to account for the true long run tradeoffs that Inuit face today in maintaining cultural values 
vs. shifting to new forms of economic activity. 
 TEK in turn might effectively expand the carrying capacity of the ecosystem and/or the 
technological capabilities of harvest (its harvest intensity within one aspect of the ecosystem or 
through the dispersion of use). This can ease the population constraints and allow for additional 
growth, but may also increase harvest pressures on the ecosystem and threaten a long run 
sustainable growth path. Thus the state variables are the resource (ecosystem) quantity, the human 
laborer population, and the level of TEK (as manifested through managerial elite holders of that 
knowledge).   
 A control decision thus exists for impact on each of the three trophic levels. These are: 
  (1) the dispersion of ecosystem resource used,  
 (2) the share of ecosystem resource used in trade, and 
 (3) the share of ecosystem resource used for TEK and related physical capital. 
 
The control decisions impose associated costs that are non-decreasing in the intensity of control. 
The combination of the choices over the controls and the impact of their costs as values for 
consumption, trade and capital shift determine the community path over time. In addition to system 
exit, a sustainable balanced growth path requires that use of the composite ecosystem resource 
remains slow enough to avoid collapse but intense enough to allow growth in well-being. Growth in 
capital (TEK) may be able to increase well-being, but only if balance can be maintained. In other 
words, TEK that is used to expand the resource base or the (dynamically supportable) dispersive use 
of the ecosystem is more likely to increase sustainable well-being than TEK that increases intensity 
of use of a single component of the ecosystem.  
The system linkages of the resource-based system that determine whether economic 
conditions warrant system exit (without collapse), a sustainable, technology-dependent balanced 
growth system, or system collapse (or related system cycles that generate losses to dynamic 
welfare), can be expressed in three interrelated shadow values, one for each level of the multi-
trophic system. 
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At the base, the shadow value of the ecosystem – that is, the true opportunity cost of using 
a valuable unit of the ecosystem -- is equal to the full marginal costs of acquiring that unit of the 
resource. This full marginal cost includes harvest costs, costs from dispersive use of the system, and 
costs of TEK investment, net of its value from trade (exiting the system). Thus, shifts in any one of 
these costs or values will permeate throughout the system through changes in the value of the 
ecosystem base.  
Similarly, the shadow value on the human population base is equal to the value of the 
resource for subsistence, net of its value for trade and the costs of the resource devoted to TEK 
capital, scaled by the intrinsic growth rate of the human population. In other words, the shadow 
value is the additional value from population growth foregone from devoting another unit of the 
resource to trade or capital.  
  Finally, the shadow value on TEK formation is the foregone returns from using the 
marginal unit for trade or human population growth. 
4. Applied analysis for Inuit communities 
The multi-dimensional system presented here is rich in potential detail and will be explored at 
greater length in additional work, but we focus here only on pieces where the Inuit case is 
particularly revealing to the overall discussion regarding governance issues that pertain to long run 
sustainable development from an ecosystem base. We turn therefore to examine these interrelated 
aspects of potential interest in that context:  
        (1) shifts in relative values for subsistence, trade, and TEK capital; 
 (2) changes in returns to cooperation (requiring management); 
(3) changes in returns to TEK affecting dispersive ecosystem use and/or ecosystem 
carrying capacity; and 
 (4) conditions governing exit from the ecosystem. 
We examine the interrelated effects of these aspects on the limited historical development of 
governance by the Inuit through two cases: first, the introduction of trade via Russian and other 
European fur interests, and second, whales and whaling.  
4.1 The fur trade 
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 Trade between Russia and subarctic portions of Alaska (mainly the Aleutian Islands) for furs 
was underway by the 17th Century (Bockstoce, 2009). The sale of Alaska to the Americans in 1867 
expanded this trading network, already well developed in Southern Alaska and the Aleutians by 
Russian, American and British traders, and expanding north since reports of Captain Cook’s foray 
through the Bering Strait sparked interest in marine and land animal triangular trade with Asia  
(Bockstoce, 2009). The map in Figure 4 illustrates the lack of expansion and connectivity even at 
the end of the 18th Century; Cook’s map was certainly enhanced from sharing by Russian traders 
(Stern, 2016) but still just scratches at the doorway of the Arctic tundra.  
Figure 4: Contemporary map illustrating Captain James Cook’s voyage in the Bering Strait. 
 
Image credit: Cassini, Giovanni Maria, Nuovo Atlante Geografico Universale Delineato Sulle 
Ultime Osservazioni, V. 3, Rome: Calcogrfia camerale, 1798, (public domain) provided to 
Wikipedia Commons by Geographicus Rare Antique Maps.  
 
 The Hudson Bay Company was founded for the exploitation of the Canadian fur trade in 
1670. Yet trade was so controlled by the monopoly at the frontier that as late as the start of the 2nd 
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world war there were still communities that had only ever interacted with one or two traders 
(Poncins, 1941). Danish colonization of Greenland dates from 1721, with earlier contact by fishers 
and traders. Danish control of Greenlandic trade outside of Inuit communities was complete enough 
to consider Greenland a closed economy (Nuttall, 2005). Trade for furs focused on a few goods. 
These goods included metal goods including kettles and knives, traps, saws, pans, guns and 
ammunition; foodstuffs including flour, sugar, and molasses; and tobacco, matches, and sewing 
implements (Bockstoce, 2009). Generally contraband alcohol was also prized for trade, though 
access was limited. Even still, the consequences of these few items infiltrating Inuit communities 
over time were dramatic. Changes in relative values and changes in returns to individual harvest 
efforts interacted with changing impacts from increased dispersive use of the ecosystem to shift 
institutional needs and individual vs. group incentives. 
 With the change in opportunities for trade that accompanied increased external contact, the 
benefits of coordination had relatively less ability to increase individual welfare. The switch in 
values to tradable goods that were individually harvestable, in particular Arctic fox, effectively 
reduced the need for coordinated hunting benefits for marine mammals and led to institutional 
changes favoring decentralization of decision-making, while increasing centralization of authority 
in the governance of property rights and to dramatic reductions in TEK. Trade in technology, 
particularly for harpoon improvements, guns, and fox traps, reduced effort costs of both group and 
individual harvests.  
 Inuit had relatively little direct use for Arctic fox prior to trade with the external world; 
generally they were not heavily harvested for subsistence use (Bailey, 1993; Damas, 2002); there is 
little evidence of investment in TEK or physical capital (traps) for harvesting foxes prior to external 
contact. The fox has also now been identified by academic science as a key part of ecosystem 
productivity in the tundra (Gharajehdaghipour, Roth, Fafard, & Markham, 2016).18 While we do not 
know what TEK regarding the fox dens was prior to trade, two facts make it likely that TEK holders 
were at least partially aware of the fox’s place in the ecosystem, in spite of their light use. These are 
(1) that fox dens are so vibrantly differentiated from the rest of the tundra that they are easily 
                                                          
18 In particular, fox dens promote plant growth that increases nitrogen on the tundra, in turn fostering additional 
plant growth and animal fodder. This essentially creates garden oases that support and expand the ecosystem’s 
productivity. 
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identifiable, even from the air (Garrott, Eberhardt, & Hanson, 1983), and (2) that when trapping did 
begin, harvest numbers were high and indicate ease in locating and trapping them (once trap 
technology arrived via trade).  
 In reverse, as prices have collapsed for fox furs, a 2011 survey of Canadian Inuit recounts that 
while 91% of older Inuit hunters (35-49) report that they know where to set fox traps and why to set 
them there, only 46% of younger (18-34) Inuit hold this TEK (Pearce et al., 2011). The return on 
such TEK has fallen significantly, just as it rose when furs became valuable through trade. The fox 
fur trade provides an explicit example of increased dispersion in ecosystem use.  
 This increased dispersion can result in shifts in ecosystem capacity. At the beginnings of the 
fur trade, the business was so profitable that Russian traders in the west expanded the range of the 
fox by introducing the species to several of the Aleutian Islands. The absence of other predator 
mammals and high abundances of birds meant that populations took hold and thrived quickly. Local 
Inuit were quick to witness declining bird populations to these introductions (Bailey, 1993; Croll, 
Maron, Estes, Danner, & Byrd, 2005). While the increase in fox populations increased market profit 
potential, it did so at the expense of bird populations valuable for subsistence. Now that fur prices 
have fallen, fox eradication and ecosystem restoration in the Aleutians have increased.  
 Whether the net impact is positive or negative for society depends on how the ecological 
interactions translate to well-being. At low levels of extraction, fox trapping increased the 
dispersion of ecosystem use and allowed the introduction of traded goods and market activity 
without significantly changing subsistence production and value. However as the fox trade 
increased, it transferred not only labor and TEK activity to trapping but also ecosystem 
productivity.  
 Efficient institutional change takes place when the net benefits to doing so are positive (T. L. 
Anderson & Hill, 1990). In particular, institutions that manage resources through common property, 
public property, or private property are perceived as alternative solutions to the open access 
problem, and comparing these institutions according to the extended Demsetz theory (e.g. Witt, 
1987) involves weighing known enforcement costs against the benefits that a particular institution 
delivers by reducing free-riding. 
 In the case of the fur trade, the increased potential for individual returns over collective 
subsistence investments make system exit a more individual choice – it can happen piecemeal and 
at the margin instead of as a group decision. System exit would not entail a group movement to new 
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hunting grounds; it rather involves individual members of the populations moving in and out of the 
educational and market opportunities of the larger, wealthy economies in which they became 
enmeshed (US, Canada, and Denmark) until the TEK becomes so depreciated that full return to the 
system is no longer possible.  
4.2 Whales and whaling 
4.2.1 Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) as technology 
While we may consider the Arctic as consisting of similar ecological systems, many nuances 
exist, meaning that TEK pertaining to one species may need refinement or change before being 
applicable to another, similar-seeming species. Furthermore, with respect to any one species, there 
may be various methods of harvest.19  
In addition to changing technology (mainly via trade), different seasons, environmental and 
geographical conditions allow for different hunting methods and thus productivity change. For 
example, the presence of shallow water bays increases the productivity of hunting Belugas by 
driving them into shallow water (Freeman et al., 1998). Also, the productivity of group hunts 
increases dramatically due to the possibility to employ combinations of hunting techniques. Even 
though it is possible to hunt Belugas with one or two hunters, i.e. by using harpoons and sealskin 
floats, larger groups of hunters could work together to drive schools of Belugas ashore and thereby 
increase the catch (Freeman et al., 1998). Thus, returns to cooperation, TEK, and related 
management exist. 
Depending on culture, geography and the type of whales to hunt, different hunting potentials are 
present.20 This also means that TEK is not only specialized on e.g. whaling, storing and sharing, but 
it is further segregated depending on the geography, climate, season and the type of whale. The 
combination of those factors shows the variety of circumstances and the complexity of knowing the 
                                                          
19 The example of Beluga hunting demonstrates many of the hunting techniques and at the same time is an 
important case in itself, because it is the most hunted whale by Canadian Inuit communities (Freeman et al., 1998). Four 
main methods exist: the whales can be driven into shallow water, a harpooning from the melting and opening ice in 
spring, shooting from ice or shore and shooting in open water (Freeman et al., 1998).  
20 One example is the hunting by Inuit in Greenland, where umiaks were used to hunt large, slow swimming whales, like humpback and bowhead whales. Faster swimming whales like fin whales cannot be easily hunted from such boats. Hunting fin whales started with the introduction of motorized boats by Danish colonialist in the in the 1920s (Freeman et al., 1998). 
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right thing to do. It determines the productivity of whaling and in turn the potential for development 
of a managerial (knowledge) group. The ability (and/or desire) to transfer this status into material 
gain is less clear.  
Depending on the whale being hunted, one can define population group sizes that produce more 
catch, as well as the minimal traditional knowledge of how to operate and manage the hunt.21 Such 
type of hunting depends on TEK to make the hunt highly productive. Hunting was productive 
enough to enable the Inuit expanding along the Canadian coast up to Greenland about 1,000 years 
ago. Harvests could reach up to 60 Bowhead annually along the Alaskan coast (Freeman et al., 
1998), and are estimated to have been about 36 bowhead per year amongst Greenlandic and Eastern 
Canadian Inuit (Higdon, 2008). These relatively low numbers in relation to the whale population 
estimates emphasize the lack of need for governance of the single species and help contextualizes 
development of governing principles as discussed in e.g. Tyrrell (2007). 
Migration patterns of whales make storing and sharing of the whale meat an important issue. 
Traditional storing knowledge can be viewed as a factor that increased the yield of the whale 
hunter, while the absence of the knowledge could be regarded as a diminishing factor of the yield. 
Storing has also the quality to reduce the risk of hunting fewer or no whales, while cultural norms 
of sharing, even outside the community, can be seen as spreading the risk of hunting fewer whales 
than needed for population sustenance on a traditional diet. 
 4.2.2 Whale and Walrus Trade: depletion and dispersion 
Figure 5 generates specific insight into an Inuit resource system once trade is introduced. The 
figure graphs the estimated annual whale mortality from the commercial whaling begun in the 
1840s in the Pacific Arctic as well as the estimated annual catch of walrus. Once the bowhead was 
discovered by commercial whalers in 1848, the catch rose immediately, and populations were 
decimated by the mid-1850s. The Arctic environment made the bowhead whale a great prize for 
whaling, as it had a much higher blubber and oil content. Its baleen was also considered high 
quality (Nichols, 2009).  
 
                                                          
21 This might include hunting with several boats, approaching the slow swimming bowhead whale without disturbing it, while being able to communicate, tire the whale with harpoons and attach floats, finally killing it (Freeman et al, 1998).  
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Figure 5: Whale and Walrus Harvests in the Western Arctic. 
 
 
In the first years of Pacific Arctic whaling, walrus were primarily ignored, or occasionally 
harvested for their ivory, which was considered inferior to other types of ivory. The dwindling 
Bowhead population, however, caused investigation into walrus’s oil content and quality, and the 
resulting success meant that some 150,000 walrus came to be harvested over 65 years.  
The first most obvious point is that the combined harvests significantly reduced the ecosystem’s 
productivity for the dependent native population. With no internationally recognized property rights 
to the marine mammals, no history of overuse and related institutional structures suggesting a need 
for governing the harvest, and no meaningful enforcement tools in any case, the fisheries were open 
access harvests for the profit of New England.22 
                                                          
22 Contrasting this situation was the simultaneous fur seal fishery south of the Bering Strait. The fishery fell under 
sole authority of the Russian American Company monopoly, and had the important feature that the main seal grounds 
for reproduction were concentrated on a few uninhabited islands (Pribilof Islands). This made first for quick and 
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The data also provides an illustration of how ecosystem knowledge can shift ecosystem use. 
Walrus are physically easier to harvest than whales due to their behavior on the ice and smaller size. 
Walrus oil refining costs were lower than whale oil refining costs, and the walrus oil price 
eventually rose above that of whale oil (Nichols, 2009). But learning their commercial value took 
time.  
Further understanding of the consequences of this harvest, and the workings of our model, come 
from qualitative reports about the visible impacts of the walrus harvest on local Inuit populations. 
Reports of starvation due to the increasing scarcity of the walrus as early as 1871 suggest wholesale 
catastrophe lay ahead if action were not taken. These predictions bore out in the winter of 1878-79 
when most of the population of St. Lawrence Island died from starvation. Efforts by at least one 
ship captain to stop walrusing were met with agreement that the natives were doomed, but also with 
the expected tragedy of the commons response where reducing harvest unilaterally simply meant 
more for another, less cooperative or humane, whaling ship to harvest (Bockstoce, 1986; Nichols, 
2009).  
The walrus had only become the staple food for local Inuit after the decimation of these Pacific 
whales; prior to this, walrus meat was mainly used to feed the dogs.  A similar story for the Eastern 
Arctic is described in Stewart, Higdon, Reeves, and Stewart (2014). Here again we see ecosystem 
dispersion at work.  
5. Conclusions 
The long run economic development of the Inuit Arctic presents a set of interesting lessons 
regarding economic growth through trade, resource governance (and lack thereof), and 
ecological knowledge and exploitation. The harsh climate of the Arctic and scarcity of 
resources, particularly for shelter and heat, kept human population growth low enough that 
resource constraints focused not on overexploitation from tragedy of the commons problems but 
on preventing underexploitation to achieve survival and subsistence. The importance of TEK in 
this system cannot be overestimated – without the undoubtedly hard-won wherewithal to turn a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
profitable overharvest, but upon recognition of the devastation, then allowed a temporary moratorium as early as 1805 
to encourage repopulation, followed by limited harvests (Veniaminov, 1984).  
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few species of large mammals and a handful of other available resources including sea-ice into 
food, clothing and shelter there would be no Inuit.  
This low human population put little pressure on the overall Arctic ecosystem, and required 
only limited direct governance. Large marine mammal hunting, however, required cooperative 
action and TEK skills and assets accumulated to successful whaling groups. This ability to 
transform TEK into subsistence provided only the most limited amounts of stratification, so that 
Inuit society should be considered extremely egalitarian overall.  
This lack of governance needs rendered Inuit societies and institutions unprepared for the 
advent of new demands on resources from outside sources. Foreign whaling fleets and fur 
trappers introduced both new technologies and new scarcities. These created multiple impacts 
on ecosystem use, all with significant consequences for lifestyle. Direct impacts included severe 
local population loss from starvation when whale and walrus populations were so decimated 
that a bad weather year could and did result in the deaths of many Inuit from starvation. Indirect 
impacts have included loss of TEK. This stemmed first from a shift in returns to individual 
exploitation of ecosystem resources over cooperative harvests of large marine mammals, as fox 
furs became easily trappable and paid well in currencies that bought new, interesting goods like 
metal kettles, tobacco, flour and sugar at trading posts. Then, as opportunities shifted further, 
TEK dissipated due to partial or complete exit from the socio-ecological system into a broader 
world.  
This latter impact is still underway – debates over whale harvesting and seal fur sales 
continue to press against the ability of Inuit to bridge traditional subsistence activities and 
modern market activities. Underlying these debates are fundamental questions of the terms of 
trade for ecosystem services that traditionally supported small Inuit populations, and are now 
under greater stress from conflicting demands across a multiplicity of goals. Exit from an Inuit 
socio-ecological system removes extractive subsistence goals from this set of challenges, and as 
such may have been welcome to many other constituencies over the centuries. At the same time, 
the lack of governance and property rights concepts that evolved with Inuit resource demands 
made such exit a relatively simple political and social affair. Today, a greater awareness of the 
technological ingenuity of Arctic Inuit peoples and their connection to the resource base and its 
flow of ecosystem services is growing. In this awareness are paths forward for adapting to the 
planet’s increasing resource scarcities and generating the types of capital that create solutions to 
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scarcity as opposed to the types of technology that result in more rapid, more devastating 
harvest and overuse of natural resources and surrounding ecosystems. 
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